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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
All parties are listed above that were in anyway involved
in the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs and the Defendant Fleischmann

are the only parties that appeared in either the trial court or
the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether or not the Courts interpret Title 78-12-12,

Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended) in accordance with the
wording of the statute or some other way.
B.

Is an agreement for other land signed by individuals

from outside the chain of

title coupled

with

possession

only

of

the captioned land and without paying taxes for seven years
sufficient for adverse possession.
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINIONS
TSSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
A.

The case that probably brought this decision out of

the Sixth District Court, with the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,

presiding, is the case of Lach v. Deseret Bank, (see Court of
Appeals case, dated December 7, 1987, on which a rehearing was
denied January 14, 1988.

Tn the Lach case, the Court of Appeals

reversed Judge Tibbs on the same questions.

There was an Earnest

Money Agreement made prior to the docketing of the judgment lien.
Judge Tibbs granted summary judgment for the creditor based upon
the judicial sale, and the Court of Appeals set aside the motion
for summary judgment.

The reversal was with a holding that from

the date that the judgment lien was filed, the property had
already been sold by virtue of a forceable transfer of rights to
a creditor for value.

Stating that there was an enforceable

right of purchase by virtue of equitable conversion, it stated
at the moment that the enforceable executory contract of sale was
created and the purchaser, thereafter, is treated as owner of the
land.

That a judgment lien created thereafter would not prevail.

In the Lach case, Judge Tibbs decided in favor of the judgment
lien on the basis that title was still in the person of record as
of the filing of the judgment lien.

This was reversed by the

Court of Appeals with the filing date of December 7, 1987.

A

rehearing on the matter was denied January 14, 1988.
B.

in the instant case of Garland v. Rigby, et al.,

after refusing both Plaintiffs' and Defendant Fleischmannfs
motions for summary judgment, the matter came before Judge Tibbs
on the 6th day of October, 1988, approximately one year or
less after the reversal in the Lach case.
the Lach case but went one further.

Judge Tibbs followed

He made the same ruling to

an existing sale contract which described different land, on

testimony that the parties who then owned no interest in the
property being the subject matter of the action, agreed that
that would be the property covered by the conditional sale
contract.

There was never an amendment to the conditional sale

contract.

The Defendant Fleischmann could not deny the state-

ment that an agreement was made by someone outside of the chain
of title.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the

Garland v. Rigby, et al. case are the subject matter of this
action and are set forth in the Addendum hereto as is the
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals and their Order
Denying the Petition for Rehearing.
Reference is made to the decision of the Court of
Appeals on a two-to-one basis of the panel that heard the item.
It was the decision of the Court of Appeals that the matter was
not to be published.

However, as a decision, it comes under

this classification of,it is either an official report or it
is an unofficial report of an opinion issued by the Court of
Appeals.
C.

The Court of Appeals of Utah in the case of Frandsen

v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111, decided the other way in a contested
matter in which they endorsed the judgment lien as against the
deed.

The basis is that the purchase was subsequent.

This is

not the same situation as when the deed was executed after the
judgment lien was filed.

At that time, it was deeded back to

the judgment debtor.
D

•

Averett v. Utah County Drainage District No.1,
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763 P.2d 428; the situation in this case does not take care of the
lien question but does take care of the adverse use.

It was a

situation of a drainage ditch and other property that had been
deeded for drainage ditch purposes many years before.

The present

land owner of adjacent land claimed adverse possession.

It was

held that public use of the ditch pertained to the land adjacent
to it that had been deeded for this purpose and took it out of
the adverse possession question.

The implication of this decision

by the Court of Appeals on the 26th day of October, 1988, is to
the effect that the adverse possession statute must be strictly
complied with.

At the sametime, the panel of the Court of Appeals

was holding in the instant case, that it does not have to be
complied with.
E.

In Marchant v. Park City and the State of Utah,

771 P.2d 677, it was decided by the Court of Appeals of Utah
on March 13, 1989, that the statute of adverse possession had
to be strictly compiled with which is identical with the case
at bar, except for the decision.

Certiorari was granted on this

item by the Supreme Court of Utah on September 5, 1989.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is as follows:
A.

The decision of the panel from the Court of Appeals

is the 1st day of September, 1989; the same was filed on that
date.
B.

The Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing was

dated the 11th day of October, 1989, and was filed on that date.

-4-

C.

Not applicable.

D.

There is a question of statutory interpretation and

conflicting opinions out of the Court of Appeals.

This falls

under the provisions of Rule 43 (1), (2) and (3).
This is a matter that was originally tried before the
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Garfield County,
Utah, and was in the area where the Supreme Court of Utah had
appellate jurisdiction.

The Notice of Appeal was originally filed

with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to statute.
The case was then assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals by the
Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-2A-3 (2)(j).

The processes of the Court of Appeals have been

exhausted.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES
At this time the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction
under the provisions of Title 78-2-2 (a) and the following
statutes.
A.

Title 78-12-7, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as

B.

Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as

amended.)

amended.)
The statutes are cited in the Addendum and are included verbatim
therein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It appears that there are two realms of time that
should be initially set forth independent of each other.
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One

is the time element of the Plaintiffs Garland and the other is
the time element of the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann.
In setting up the time elements of the Plaintiffs
Garland, one must first go to page 4 of the transcript.

The

parties that actually took part in the trial were Garland and
Anna R. Fleischmann.

Although Floyd J. Rigby had filed an

answer, he did not receive

trial notice.

Ray Hall had an

attorney present although there was no evidence that a pleading
had been filed and that there were motions for dismissal pertaining to the cause of action that was dismissed after the
trial.

Rimaras, Inc. was not represented.

The whole trial

was based upon the adverse possession of Robert G. Garland and
Mary Garland.

It was so stated by counsel on page 4 of the

transcript, at line 14, M I T m asking the Court to quiet title
to this pice of property against all of the Defendant.M

In the

next line or so, counsel indicates that all are in default except
for Miss Fleischmann and Ray Hall.

A statement was made by Hall T s

attorney that Hall claimed no interest in the property continuing with the transcript, page 4, from line 17 to page 5, line 3.
It must be remembered that there are two lots that are discussed
in this transcript.

Apparently, the Court of Appeals did not

ascertain this information.

Lot #126 in the area described is

the item set forth on the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase.

The people who signed as sellers never owned this

property.

Lot #128, two lots away, is the subject matter of this

action.

The following recites the elements pertaining to these

lots from PlaintiffTs testimony.

Garlands1 first interest in the

property appears to be the Purchase Agreement of Lot #126 with
individuals known as Rigby and Hall.

The Purchase Money Agreement

in evidence is on Lot #126, exhibit #1, which is included in the
Addendum hereto.
was Lot #126.

Although Garlands claimed it to be Lot #128, it

The Purchase Agreement was dated the 31st day of

October, 1980. (See transcript page 10, lines 1 to 17.)

There

was an attempt to change it to Lot #128, which was objected to
under the statute of fraud.

(See transcript page 11, line 6.)

There appears to be several conversations between Hall and Rigby
and the Plaintiff concerning changing of lots.

There was never

a document achieved until after the involvement of Miss
Fleischmann.

The document actually achieved was never delivered

until after the trial.

The agreement may have been enforceable

as to Lot #126; it has never been enforceable as to Lot #128.
Floyd J. Rigby and Ray Hall never owned the property.

Garlands

became aware of this when they tried to pay taxes in 1986.

At

that time, they thought they were dealing personally with Rigby
and Hall.

(See transcript page 15, lines 1 to 6.)
Mr. Garland did not pay taxes on the property until

1986 at which time he paid taxes for 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and
1985.

(See transcript, page 16, line 13, and exhibit 13.)

date of payment was January 31, 1986.

The

(See transcript, page 16,

line 30. Also see transcript page 17, lines 17 to 19 inclusive.
Also see transcript page 18, lines 8 to 10 inclusive.)

During

this period, he took possession of the property and built on
the property in the early 1980s.

He paid the 1987 taxes.

(See

transcript page 28, line 9; page 29, line 3, and exhibit 5.)
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Payment of the 1987 taxes were paid in November, 1987.

Payment

of these taxes and the testimony of Mrs. Henrie, the Garfield
County Treasurer is quite material.
lines 4 to 13.)

(See transcript page 39,

On page 40 of the transcript, line 1 shows that

the five years — 1 9 8 2 through 1985 inclusive—taxes were paid by
Mr. Garland in 1986.

The rest of page 40 of the transcript shows

that Mr. Garland paid the 1987 taxes.

Exhibit 8 on page 41 of

the transcript identifies a lady jn Nevada, Miss Fleischmann,
as the person who paid the 1986 taxes prior to the trial.

At

the time of the trial, they were paid.
The other essential time element is the title of Lot
#128.

This was established by a title person by the name of

Thomas B. Hatch, (see transcript pages 33 to 39.)

On page 33,

at line 22 of the transcript, Lot #128 was identified as exhibits
10 and 11.
a deed.

Exhibit 10 was an abstract; exhibit 11 was a copy of

Mr. Rigby and Mr. Hall never owned any interest in the

property during the time of the abstract.
35, lines 18 to 26.)

(See transcript, page

At such time, the Court asked Mr. Hatch to

run through the abstract.

(See transcript, page 35, line 23.)

The abstrat^ checked back to 1940, when a Mrs. Jensen owned the
property.

The property was then deeded to a Mr. and Mrs. Allen.

When Mr. Allen died, a tax waiver from the Utah State Tax Commission and an affidavit of survivorship were filed.
page 37, lines 1 to 8.)

(See transcript

Mrs. Warwick, the remarried Mrs. Allen,

deeded the property to Rimaras, Tnc. on the 14th of July, 1981.
There was never any transfer of title whatsoever until the time
of trial. (See transcript, page 37, lines 22 to 25.)

There v/as no

transfer of title until the Fleischmann judgment.
page 38, lines 14 and 15.)

(See transcript

From this, it can be seen that the

effective date of the filing of the Fleischmann judgment in Garfield
County was the 8th day of July, 1985, at which time the property was
in the name of Rimaras, Inc.

Rimaras is not a party to any agree-

ment and no one in chain of title dealt with the Plaintiffs.
written agreement of Hall and Rigby was on Lot #126.

The

There was

nothing but verbal agreements between Hall and Rigby pertaining
to Lot #128 and Rimaras was not a party to the same.

The redemp-

tion time expired, and the SheriffTs deed was recorded after the
suit was started but was recorded before trial.

The question is,

what was the interest of Rimaras, Inc. in Lot #128 on July 8,
1985.

This was the date of the judgment lien recording to Anna R.
The SheriffTs deed was delivered and recorded after

Fleischmann.

the suit was started.

The abstract was entered as exhibit 10 and

was identified by Mr. Hatch.
to 15.

(See transcript, page 34, lines 14

The same is dated July, 1988.)

Hall or Rigby in the title whatsoever.

There is no reference to
Mr. Hatch in his testi-

mony made the statement on page 36, n A deed that was recorded
July 14th, 1981, to a Rimaras, Inc., who I am told is Mr. Hall
and Mr. Rigby.
statement."

I have no actual knowledge that that is a true

There is no evidence whatsoever outside of this

atatement of any involvement of Mr. Hall or Mr. Rigby in Rimaras,
Inc.

There is a finding by the Court, that exhibit 2, together

with exhibit 4 that shows the interest of Rimaras, Inc. was
never delivered to the purchaser Garland.
62, line 3.)

(See transcript, page

Garland at that time was on notice that this

property belonged to Rimaras, Inc. and did nothing about it.

There was a Sherifffs sale on the 11th day oi January, 1988, to
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann,
ARGUMENTS
A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS INTERPRET
TITLE 78-12-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953, as amended) TN ACCORDANCE
WTTH THE WORDING OF TEH STATUTE OR
SOME OTHER WAY

There should be very little argument about this.
Supreme Court of Utah, and to some degree, the Court

The

)f Appeals

have followed this doctrine without limitation to the effect
that adverse possession has to strictly comply with this statute,
Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended.)

Prior

to the case of Home OwnerT s Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P.2d 160, which was decided in 1943, to the effect that
adverse possession can only be acquired in accordance with the
exact provisions of the statute requiring adverse possession to
be for a continuous period of time during which a claimant is in
possession, has paid all taxes levied and levied on that particular
property and there must be indicia of title.

At that time rather

than Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended),
the Court used Title 104-2-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1943, as
amended.)

There is a considerable amount of discussion of

adverse possession, how it is interpreted and how it is acquired.
And that the statute must be strictly complied with, with taxes
being paid and there must be andicia of title.

This was a reversal

of the trial court by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

In

all probability, it is a leading case in this particular area.
This doctrine has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah many times.

In the case oJ Koyal Street Land Company

v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, decided on the 9th day of July, 1987,
the doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah.

Where there is a long time history, one cannot help but

wonder what was intended by the authors of the Memorandum Decision
in the instant case, Garland v. Rigby, et al. and the divided
decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah on the 1st day of
September, 1989, where it was rendered with the statement under
the words, Memorandum Decision,

T

(Not for Publication) 1 .

Also,

one must look to the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Russell W.
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, where in his opinion, he upheld
the judgment lien of Miss Fleischmann.
However, since this Memorandum Decision of the Court of
Appeals in this Garland v. Rigby, et al. situation, filed the 1st
day of September, 1989, and the Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, dated and filed the 11th day of October, 1989, the Supreme
Court of Utah has upheld the doctrine that the statute of 78-12-12,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended,) must be strictly upheld.
In the case of Grayson Roper Limited Partnership, et al. v.
Finlinson, et al., 119 Utah Advance Reports, decided by the
Honorable George E. Ballif in Millard County, Utah, and appealed
to the Supreme Court of Utah, and on which the Supreme Court of
Utah has taken jurisdiction instead of remanding it back to the
Utah Court of Appeals, as they did the Garland case, and in the
opinion on the Grayson Roper Limited Partnership, et al. v.
Finlinson, et al., filed on the 17th day of October, 1989, it
was stated that there must be strict compliance in relation to
Title 78-12-12, and it was upheld.
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Tt was an unanimous decision

of the Supreme Court of Utah, with a Court of Appeals Judge sitting
in as a substitute for Associate Justice Howe.

There is a stunning

declaration of statutory construction very correctly done.

On

page 30 of 119 Utah Advance Reports, there is this statement found
in the second column, line nineteen, in relation to statutory
construction as follows:
land is deemed to have been possessed and
occupied by a party seeking to establish
adverse possession. They specify that
cultivation of crops suffices for possession or occupation. But that alone is not
enough to establish a claim of adverse
possession. Payment of taxes is also
required. Section 78-12-12 provides:
f

In no case shall adverse possession be considered established
under the provisions of any section
of this code, unless it shall be
shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period
of seven years continuously, and
that the party, his predessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which
have been levied and assessed upon
such land according to law.!
Thereafter, there is considerable discussion of what payment of
taxes means.
B.

IS AN AGREEMENT FOR OTHER LAND SIGNED
BY INDIVIDUALS FROM OUTSIDE THE CHAIN
OF TITLE COUPLED WITH POSSESSION ONLY
OF CAPTIONED LAND AND WITHOUT PAYING
TAXES FOR SEVEN YEARS SUFFICIENT FOR
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

This gets to the point where anyone who wants a piece of
that is coming up for a judgment sale, if he is in the position
where the purchaser cannot deny his verbal statement that he
agreed with a deceased owner or a prior owner where there is
no contract, saying, "I bought that piece of property when a

stranger appears at the judgment sale.

In the event the Supreme

Court of Utah sees fit in this Garland v. Rigby, et al. case to
follow the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this puts in
jeopardy every title insurance item in the State of Utah that is
based upon a judgment sale.

All a person has to do to take the

property is to show up and say, "I had a possible deal on this
property with John who is now not available and not in the chain
of title, and I want the property."

Enforcement of this Court of

Appeals decision will be in the opinion of the undersigned
jeopardize a great deal of title insurance in the State of Utah.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in many, many cases
culminating in the case- of Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v.
Finlinson, et al., decided on the 17th day of October, 1989, and
found at 119 Utah Advance Reports, 29, quickly turned its back
on this thought.

The failure of Garland to pay the 1986 taxes

entirely does away with everything else that he has done.

The

fact that they were paid by Fleischmannrs representative after
the suit was commenced for adverse possession does not remedy
this situation.
In the Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson
case, cited above, in October, 1989, the Supreme Court of Utah
defines the intent of Title 78-12-12, and the requirement that
the intent be complied with.

In addition, to the cases of Home

Owner T s Corp. v. Dudley, quoted above and Royal Street Land
Company v. Reed, quoted above, decided in 1943 and 1987, it
reiterates the doctrine of strict complaince with that statute.
It cites Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, pages 193 and 194,
decided June 10, 1954, which is an endorsement of the doctrine,

and it cites other cases even ahead of the landmark case of Home
Owner's Corp. v. Dudley, cited above.

There are many other cases

prior to Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, et al.
in which the Supreme Court has been consistent in finding the
meaning of the statute and requiring compliance with the statute.
The same doctrine should bo applied to the case at bar, Garland
v. Rigby, et al.
DATED this

+ ) clay of

^tV/-'/*/'< V\ 1989.

Respectfuliy submi tted,

PATRICK II. FENTON
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Anna H. Fleischmann
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Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland,

ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No- 880707-CA

v.
Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall,
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah corporation,
and Anna R. Fleischmann,
Defendants and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is
denied.

DATED this

day of October, 1989

FOR THE COURT:

Mary T./Noonan
Clerk 6t the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 1989, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail,
Patrick H. Fenton
Attorney for Appellant, Anna Flieschmann
#154 North Main
P.O. Box 337
Cedar City, UT 84720
Michael W. Park
Park, Braithwaite & Eves
Attorneys for Respondents
110 North Main Street, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Willard R. Bishop
Bishop & Ronnow, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant, Ray Hall
36 North 300 West
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
DATED this 11th day of October, 1989.

By
Deputy Clerk
1/
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

,

SEP1 1^39

Robert G. Garland and Mary
Garland,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISlBW1Cou!Vof ' VM " JS
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 880707-CA

Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall,
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah
corporation, and Anna R.
Fleischmann,
Defendants and Appellant.

Sixth District, Garfield County
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
Attorneys:

Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for Appellant
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for Respondents

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant Anna R. Fleischmann appeals from the trial
court's order quieting title to a parcel of property referred
to as lot 128 in respondents, Robert and Mary Garland. We
affirm.
Fleischmann does not challenge the trial court's findings
of fact. Therefore, we review the court's decision under a
correction-of-error standard according no deference to its
legal conclusions. See, e.g.. Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d
1046, 1048 (Utah 1987). Nonetheless,
[s]ince this is an action at law, upon
review, the findings and judgment of the
trial court will be presumed valid, and the
record will be reviewed in a light favorable
to them. The appellant is required to
sustain the burden of proving error, and the

judgment of the trial court will not be
disturbed if there be substantial evidence
in the record to support it.
Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1977) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
Giving Fleischmann the benefit of the doubt, she claims
the trial court erred in concluding, 1) the Garlands took the
property by adverse possession, 2) Rimaras, Inc. had no legal
interest in lot 128 in July 1985 when Fleischmann filed her
judgment lien, and 3) Fleischmann did not acquire lot 128 as a
result of the sheriff's sale.
We first address Fleischmann's adverse possession claim.
We agree the trial court's order cannot be sustained under a
theory of adverse possession. However, adverse possession was
neither raised, argued, nor relied upon as the basis for the
trial court's order. Following counsels' closing arguments,
the trial court asked the Garlands' counsel, "how do you even
get your basis for your title? You haven't even got it under
adverse possession." Furthermore, the Garlands at no time
suggested that they owned the property by virtue of adverse
possession. Rather, the Garlands relied on, among other
theories, the doctrine of oral agreement and full performance.
Fleischmann's second and somewhat confusing claim is that
no legal conveyance occurred between Rimaras, Inc. and the
Garlands because a conveyance of title to the Garlands was not
recorded prior to the date her judgment lien attached to the
property. However, Utah law is clear—recordation is not a
prerequisite to a valid conveyance of real estate as between
the parties to the transaction. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6
(1986) (repealed by 1988 Utah Laws ch. 155, § 24); Gregerson v.
Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983). "[A] conveyance of real
property is valid and binding between parties, even without
recordation." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642
P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). See also Huntington Citv v.
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (1974) (title
passed at date deed was delivered, notwithstanding no
recordation).
Moreover, Fleischmann is not entitled to the statutory
protections accorded subsequent purchasers under Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-3-3 (1989). It is clear that she had actual notice of the
Garlands' purported interest: in lot 128 prior to the sheriff's
sale, thereby precluding Fleischmann from being a "good faith"
purchaser under the statute. Accordingly, the resolution of

this dispute is not controlled by the recording statutes.
Greaerson, 669 P.2d at 398.

Cf,

Utah law is also clear that a judgment lien attaches to
the nonexempt real property of the debtor, but is "'subordinate
and inferior to a deed which predate[s] it, whether recorded
after such judgment or whether not recorded at all.'" Lach v.
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, 791
(1956)). We find no relevant distinction between property
conveyed by deed or property conveyed by other legally valid
methods. The foregoing rule of law applies with equal force to
any effective conveyance of real property occurring before the
date the judgment lien attaches.
"[I]f the unrecorded conveyance was one
which was made in good faith and for value,
the lien would not attach, even though the
judgment creditor had no knowledge or notice
of it. By merely docketing his judgment, a
judgment creditor parts with nothing, and
does not become entitled to have the
property of an innocent purchaser for value
applied in satisfaction of a debt he does
not owe. M
Wilson v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 280 Or. 45, 569 P.2d 609,
611 (1977) (quoting Thompson v. Hendricks, 118 Or. 39, 245 P.
724, 726-27 (1926)).
Although the trial court's legal basis for quieting title
in the Garlands rested on a theory of equity and fairness,
which, without more, cannot be sustained, in the interest of
judicial economy, this court "may affirm trial court decisions
on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having
assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v.
UWC Assocs,, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). See also Mel
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,
456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the narrow issue
presented on appeal is whether the record supports a finding
that Rimaras, Inc. had no ownership interest in lot 128 on or
after the date Fleischmann's lien was docketed.
At trial, the Garlands quiet title action rested in large
part on a theory of oral agreement and part or full
performance. Cf.. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417
(Utah 1984); Legrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158,
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486 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1971). After reviewing the record,
including Mr. Garland's undisputed testimony, the pleadings, in
which admissions of fact contained therein are treated as
conclusive against the party making them, see Baldwin, 676 P.2d
at 415, and Rimaras, Inc.'s post-trial stipulation, we conclude
the evidence supports the Garlands' legal theory.
Mr. Garland testified that the parties entered into an
oral agreement to purchase lot 128. In reliance, Mr. Garland
took possession and constructed a cabin on the property. In
consideration for the property, Mr. Garland gave personal
property to Hall and Rigby. Mr. Garland's undisputed affidavit
stated that he paid the purchase price in full pursuant to the
parties' agreement.
In his answer to the Garlands' complaint, Floyd Rigby did
not deny that the Garlands entered into an agreement with
Rimaras, Inc. to purchase lot 128, and thus his failure to
respond is deemed an admission. Ray Hall, in his answer,
affirmatively asserted that he acted on behalf of Rimaras, Inc.
during all relevant times to this action. Finally, Rimaras,
Inc.'s post-trial stipulation disclaimed any interest in the
property as of 1982, and affirmatively asserted that the
Garlands were the owners of the property and entitled to
possession as of that same year. Moreover, we treat the
stipulation as binding between the parties in the absence of a
legitimate challenge to the validity of the agreement. See
generally Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216, 220
(1947). Although Fleischmann did challenge the stipulation
generally, in the proceedings below, the trial court did not
rule on the challenge nor does Fleischmann renew her challenges
before this court.
Accordingly, we find the evidence supports the Garlands'
theory of oral contract and full performance, and thus, the
trial court's conclusion that Rimaras, Inc. had no interest in
the property either at the time the lien was docketed or at the
time of the sheriff's sale. The order quieting title to lot
128 in the Garlands is affirmed.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

CONCUR

Orme, Judge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The majority's affirmance of the trial court's order seems
to be based on the fact that Rimaras had no legal interest in
lot 128 when Fleischmann filed her judgment lien. Record title
clearly shows that Rimaras owned the property on that date. Any
claim that the Garlands may have had to the disputed property
derives from actions and promises by Hall and Rigby—not
Rimaras. There is not even a claim that Hall and Rigby ever
owned the property or that Rimaras is the alter ego of Hall and
Rigby. My colleagues' decision suggests that a disclaimer of
interest by record owner Rimaras can alter title to the
disadvantage of judgment creditor Fleischmann. I believe that
is contrary to law.
I would reverse the "equitable" judgment of the trial court.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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correct copy of the foregoing Memoran Decision was mailed to each of
the following:
Patrick H. Fenton
Attorney at Law
#154 North Main
P.O. Box 337
Cedar City, UT 84720
Michael W. Park
Attorney at Law
110 North Main Street, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Willard R* Bishop
Attorney at Law
36 North 300 West
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Hon. Don V. Tibbs.
Sixth District Court
Garfield County
#3261
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J u l i a C. Wftitfield
Deputy Clerk

MICHAEL W. PARK (2516)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 N. Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6532
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT G. GARLAND and
MARY GARLAND,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 86-431

FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL,
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and ANNA R.
FLEISCHMANN,
Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R.
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton
and

the

Court

having

heard

the testimony

of

the parties

and

having reviewed th^ exhibits and having heard the arguments of
counsel, now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1.
from

The Court finds that the Plaintiff purchased property

Floyd

Rigby

and

Ray

Hall

in

the

area

of Mammoth

Creek

Estates, pursuant to a certain earnest n ^ney receipt and offer to
purchase.

The Court finds that the P aintiffs were given the

option to take a different lot in the Tommy Creek Subdivision and

Plaintiffs examined

the premises and exercised

their option to

purchase lot #128.
2.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiffs

possession of lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision
purchased

a cabin kit

from

went

into

in 1981 and

Floyd Rigby or Ray Hall

and put a

cabin on lot #128.
3.

The Court

possession
Plaintiff

of

finds that the Plaintiffs were in physical

said

became

cabin

ill

and

on

a regular

could

not go

basis

until

to the

high

1986

when

altitudes

because of said illness.
4.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs received a letter

from Ray Hall on January 21, 1981, together with a copy of a deed
and the Defendant, Ray Hall said in his letter that the warranty
deed would be recorded and that the seller, at that time was Ray
Hall and Floyd Rigby.
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff did not take further

action until there was notice that a Sheriff's sale would be held
on the 11th day of January, 1988 and said Sheriff T s sale was for
lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision.
6.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff paid taxes on the

property for the years 1981, 1987.

1 '3,

984 and 1985.

The Court finds that the P aintiff paid the taxes for

the year 1987 and that the attorney for Anna R. Fleischmann paid
the taxes for the year 1986.
8.

The

Fleischmann

Court

finds

that

th

attorney

for

Anna

R.

obtained a judgment against Rimaras Inc., and filed

said judgment of record on the 8th day of July, 1985.

9.

The

Court

finds

that

the

property

was

noticed

for

Sheriff's sale on January 11, 1988 and that the attorney for Anna
R. Fleischmann and the attorney for Plaintiffs attended said sale
and the attorney for Plaintiffs put Fleischmanns on notice that
the Plaintiffs claimed that they owned all of lot #128 and the
cabin situated thereon and Fleischmann was put on notice, through
her attorney, prior to the time of the Sheriff T s sale.
10.

The Court finds that the Sheriff ? s sale took place and

the Sheriff's deed was issued to Fleischmann on July 12, 1988.
11.

The Court finds that on November 11, 1987, that Floyd

Rigby wrote to Plaintiffs and told him that he would give Mr.
Garland

a warranty

deed

from

Rimaras,

Inc.,

to

Mr.

& Mrs.

Garland, if Mr. Garland would pay certain amounts requested by
Mr. Rigby as set forth in the letter.

The Court finds that Mr.

Garland refused to pay that amount.
12.

The Court finds that the record title is in the name of

Mrs. Anna R. Fleischmann, pursuant to a Sheriff T s deed and that
possession of the property is in the Plaintiffs.
13.

The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., is in default and

asserts no ownership interest in said property and that Ray Hall,
through

his

attorney,

Willard

R.

Bishop,

does

not

claim

an

ownership interest in said property.
14.

The Court finds that the case of Kartchner v. State Tax

Commission,

294 P.2d

790, (Utah 1956) is controlling and that

the Defendant, Anna R. Fleischmann purchased

whatever

interest

Rimaras owned in lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision at Shei-ff's
sale.

15.
ownership

The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., did not have any
interest

in the property

at the

tine

the

Sheriff's

sale was made*
16.

The Court finds that to hold otherwise would shock the

Court and that it would be patently unfair to deliver the real
property and the cabin to the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact the Court concludes
that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment quieting title to
said property in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants
Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras Inc., and Ray Hall.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on the 13th day of October, 1988,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class,
postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North
Main Street, Cedar City, UT

84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP

& RQNNOW, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, UT

84720.
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MICHAEL W. PARK (2516)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 N. Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6532
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT G. GARLAND and
MARY GARLAND,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

vs.
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL,
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and ANNA R.
FLEISCHMANN,

Civil No. 86-431

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R.
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fento/i
and

the

Court

having

heard

the testimony

of

the

parties

and

having reviewed the exhibits and having heard the arguments of
counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that title r.o th>^
following described property located in Garfield County, State of
Utah is hereby quieted in favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary
Garland and against Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Anr. i R.
Fleischmann and Ray Hall,

Said property is located in Gar.ield

County, State of Utah and more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 128 MAMMOTH CREEK RANCHETTS, TOMMY CREEK UNIT 1,
a subdivision, according to the Official Plat thereof,
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of said
County.
Rimaras,

Inc.,

a Utah

Corporation,

Ray Hall

and Anna

R.

Fleischraann have no interest in said_property.
DATED this 2 J Jl~day^pf^October, 198&
»
.^v- \ \ A > ~
DQN^VL. TIBBS
j
DISTRICT^COURT/JUDGE

MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that on the 13th day of October, 1988,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing,

first class,

postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North
lain Street, Cedar City, UT

84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP

& RONNOW, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, UT

.84720.
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78-12-7

JUDICIAL CODE

find not when cause is created, 3 A. L. E.
682.
Limitation applicable to action for consequential damage as result of t a k i n g or
damaging of property for public use, 30
A. L. B. 1190, 139 A. L. R. 1288.
Limitation applicable to action or proceeding by owner for compensation where
property is taken in exercise of eminent
domain without antecedent condemnation
proceeding, 123 A. L. R. 676.
Posting of notice or other steps preliminary to nonjudicial foreclosure of mort-

gage or deed of trust as suspending statute
of limitations, 122 A. L. R. 938.
S t a t u t e of limitations applicable to action for encroachment, 24 A. L. R. 2d 903.
When does cause of action accrue, for
purposes of s t a t u t e of limitations, against
action based upon encroachment of building or other structure upon land of another, 12 A. L. R. 3d 1265.
When s t a t u t e of limitations or laches
commences to run against action to set
aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer
in fraud of creditors, 100 A. L. R. 2d 1094.

78-12-7. Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner.—In every
action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation
of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under
and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property
has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years
before the commencement of the action.
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; 0. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-7.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-7 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. SectionL
104-2-7 was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 19,»
§ 1; t h a t provision is compiled as 78-127.1 herein. The Supreme Court held thel
amendment was valid despite the repeal of
section 104-2-7.
Cross-Kef erences.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to privates
rights of way or to any other class ofJ
easement by prescription. Harkness v.
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291.
Admission.
In action to recover possession of certain real property, defended on ground ofe
adverse possession, defendant's applica• tion to enter lands as homestead, held1
direct admission t h a t legal titlo to landss
was in United States. Hanks v. Lee, 57J
U. 537, 195 P. 302.
Boundary dispute.
In an action to quiet title where it wass
proved that fence separating the litigants'i'
properties was off center, but had beenii
maintained on the same line for 58 years,!,
a boundary by acquiescence was created.I.
Provonsha v / P i t m a n , 6 II. (2d) 26, 3055
P. 2d 486.

Cotenants.
F a c t t h a t some of tenants in common
have been in exclusive possession of the
common property for more than seven
years is not sufficient to show t h a t their
possession has been adverse to other cotenants, since cotenant is entitled to possession of entire property so long as he
does not exclude his cotenants or otherwise clearly act adversely to their rights,
and, to acquire title by adverse possession, cotenant must in some way indicate
to his cotenants t h a t he is claiming t h e
X>roperty adversely to them. Sperry v.
Tolley, 114 U. 303, 199 P . 2d 542.
F a c t t h a t some of tenants in common
contracted to purchase t a x titles to the
common property in their own names
was insufficient to put other cotenants on
notice of adverse claims by such t e n a n t s
in common, since other cotenants had right
to believe t h a t tax titles were being purchased for their benefit and not in opposition to them. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 U.
303, 199 P. 2d 542.
Repairs and improvements made by
cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and fences were insufficient to put
other cotenants on notice t h a t cotenants
in possession were claiming title adversely
to them, since such acts were normally
consistent with tenancy in common and
not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 U.
303, 199 P. 2d 542.
While "for sale" advertisement as to
part of common property by cotenants
in possession was sufficient to put other
cotenants on notice of adverse claim, sufficient time had not elapsed therefrom to
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when it was suitable only for placer mining, where smother subsequently and surreptitiously located and filed placer claim
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac.
Co., 07 IT. 590, 248 P. 819.
Defendants failed to establish occupation or possession of certain land within
limits of requirements of this section,
where only evidence of possession consisted of use by defendants of t h a t land
for grazing of their cattle, which use
was not exclusive inasmuch as third person used the land for same purpose to
knowledge of defendants without intervention or complaint on their part. J e n k i n s
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871.
Repairs and improvements made~by' cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and fences were insufficient to put
other eotenants on notice that cotenants
in possession were claiming title adversely
to them, since such acts were normally
consistent with tenancy in common and
not adverse to it. Sperrv v. Tollev, 114
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542.
Maintenance of a fence, payment of
taxes, and other evidence of possession
and occupation for over twenty years
were sufficient to establish ownership as
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 6 U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513.
Collateral References.
Adverse Possession<§=>19-21.
2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et seq.

78-12-12

3 Am. Jur. 2d i>7 et seq., Adverse ]>
session § 19 et seq.
Acquisition by user or prescription of
right of way over uninclosed land, 46 A. L.
K. 2d 1140.
Adverse possession based on encroachment of building or other structure, 2 A.
L. R. 3d 1005.
Adverse possession involving ignorance
or mistake as to boundaries—modern
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171.
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R.
1373.
Adverse possession of railroad right of
-way, 50 A. L. R. 303.
Cutting of timber as adverse possession,
170 A. L. R. 887.
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural crop as fulfilling traditional elements
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818.
Possession by widow after extinguishment of dower as adverse to heirs or their
privies, 75 A. L. R. 147.
Reputation as to ownership or claim as
admissible on question of adverse possession, 40 A. L. R, 2d 770.
Use by public as affecting acquisition by
individual of right of wav by prescription,
111 A. L. R, 221.
Use of property by public as affecting
acquisition of title bv adverse possession,
56 A. L. R, 3d 1182. "

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case
shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of
any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-12.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section
104-2-12 was amended by Laws 1951, ch.
19, § 1 ; t h a t provision is compiled as 7812-12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held
the amendment was valid despite the repeal of section 104-2-12.
Cross-Kef erences.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq.
Acquisition of title in general.
Where claimant under claim of owner-

ship went into actual possession of certain
lots which had been sold to county for
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter
fenced lots and commenced to improve
them, subsequently receiving deed from
county, held possession wTas adverse, from
time of entry, as to all the world except
county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 U. 185, 120
P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175.
Open, notorious and hostile use and possession of the property and payment of
taxes thereon, all under claim of right,
will constitute adverse possession. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P . 1100.
Where defendant and his predecessors
had been in actual, open, and adverse
possession of land for statutory period,
and for seven successive years had paid
taxes thereon, and they were inclosed,
occupied, and cultivated, title was ac-
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